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The Use Of Parol Evidence In Cases
Involving Written Instruments
By WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY

Undertaking to write a short paper
on the use of parol evidence will succeed, where all else may fail, in making
a man humble. This is particularly true
of a law teacher assuming to write especially for the practicing bar. The use of
parol evidence is as broad as the practice
of law itself, and I know of no area
where the published opinions of appellate courts, the primary raw materials of
the teacher, provide so few real-life
insights into the way our processes of
litigation and decision-making actually
operate.
Thus constrained, I trust, to humility,
I want to discuss briefly the use of parol
evidence,' emphasizing its relation to
written contracts, without any implication that the problems are so limited.
This subject immediately calls to the
mind of any lawyer a fearsome thing
1. The influence of the work of Pro-

fessor Arthur L. Corbin on the analysis
offered here will be readily apparent to
anyone who has examined his monumental
treatise on contracts. My indebtedness is
gratefully acknowledged.

called the parol evidence rule, one of
the classic misnomers of our law. The
doctrine parading under this name does
not operate solely to exclude "parol"
evidence, if by this term is meant "oral"
evidence. Many kinds of documentary
evidence, letters, draft contracts, binder
agreements, and such, may find their
path into the record blocked by the
invocation of the doctrine. Secondly,
the doctrine is not a rule of evidence,
at least not directly, since it is not concerned primarily with the probative value of evidence or with its tendency to
mislead or prejudice the trier of fact.
In its proper application the doctrine
is basically a reflection of substantive

notions designed to delimit the
and content of legally significant
And thirdly, the doctrine is not "a
rather, it is a whole complex of

scope
acts.
rule",
rules

dealing with analytically discrete problems. However, despite these terminological defects, it is impossible immediately

to purge our literature or our thinking
of the common term, parol evidence rule,

and it will be used occasionally in this
paper.

Native of Greenville, South Carolina,
William Burnett Harvey received his
A.B. from Wake Forest College in North
Carolina in 1943. Following three years
of Navy service, he entered the University of Michigan Law School, obtaining
a J.D. in January 1949. For the next
two years he was associated with the
Washington firm of Hogan and Hartson,
but since 1951 has been an associate
professor of law at the university.
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While I was reviewing the Michigan
decisions in the preparation of this
paper, one fact became increasingly apparent. Among the multitude of opinions, there was no carefully articulated
analysis and statement of the parol evidence rule. In this situation, perhaps
the best approach is to work backward
to an affirmative statement of doctrine
by reference to some well-settled rules
as to what the parol evidence rule is
not-as to situations in which it clearly
does not apply. In the first place, it is
entirely clear that the rule does not
apply to proof of a modifying agreement made after formation of the written
contract. 2 The mere fact that parties
have made an agreement, and with all
due solemnity incorporated it in a writing, does not deprive them of the private autonomy which enabled them to
contract initially. They may later modify,
vary or utterly wipe out their earlier
written agreement, and, absent a distinct
legal requirement of a writing, they may
do so by an oral transaction, proof of
which is admissible in a later action
on the instrument. It should be emphasized, however, that such modifying
transactions will themselves be tested
by substantive rules like those concerning mutual assent, consideration, discharge, waiver, and, in some instances,
requirements as to form such as the
Statute of Frauds. But these have nothing to do with the so-called parol evidence rule.
It is also clear that extrinsic evidence
is admissible to show that a written
instrument is voidable because induced
by fraud.3 This is true even though the
2. Johnson v. Douglas, 281 Mich. 247,
274 N.W. 780 (1937); Turner v. Williams,
311 Mich. 563, 19 N.W. (2d) 100 (1945).
3. Schupp v. Davey Tree Expert Co.,
235 Mich. 268, 209 N.W. 85 (1926);
Gloeser v. Moore, 283 Mich. 425, 278 N.W.
72 (1938), where the court, while approving the rescission-for fraud-theory, actually
decided that plaintiff's action was for breach
of contract and seemingly approved plaintiff's use of parol evidence to prove undertakings by defendant beyond those contained
in the writing; Robinson v. Great Lakes.
College, Inc., 294 Mich. 192, 292 N.A
701 (1940), fraudulent inducement of a
deed.

writing contains an express provision that
no agreements or representations, written
or oral, other than those printed in the
document, shall be binding on the
parties. 4 Similarly, evidence is admissible
to show that the document is void or
voidable on the ground of duress, illegality, mistake or incompetence of parties. Thus, before the parol evidence
rule can apply to protect a writing as
a legal act, it must be free of these
defects in its creation.

Counsel Not Sought
Unfortunately, parties about to execute a document intended to affect their
legal relations in some important way
frequently do not seek competent counsel to assist in its preparation, but rely
on themselves, their banker, broker or
insurance agent. Not uncommonly it is
later found that the instrument prepared
to state their understanding does not do
so, but by mistake contains words the
parties did not intend to use, or else
the words they intended to use do not
have the legal effect they contemplated.
We refer to such cases as involving a
mistake in integration-that is, the word
symbols chosen by the parties as the
integrated expression of their transaction
do not reflect their intention. It is well
recognized that in an equity suit or its
modern successor, the party aggrieved
by the mistake may seek to have the
writing reformed, and toward that end
may prove the true agreement by extrinsic evidence, written or oral.) The
parol evidence rule has no operation
here. A more interesting question is
whether such evidence is usable only in
an equity suit for reformation of the
instrument, or whether it may be adduced to support a defense of mistake
when a law action is brought on the
mistaken document. This latter use may
sidestep certain safeguards as to burden
4. Plate v. District Fidelity & Surety
Co., 229 Mich. 482, 201 N.W. 457 (1924).
5. Donaldson v. Hull, 258 Mich. 388.
242 N.W. 732 (1932); Scott v. Grot, 301
Mich. 226, 3 N.W. (2d) 254, 141 A.L.R.

819 (1942).
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of proof which have been thought to
characterize the equity suit, but 6there
is some Michigan authority for it.

Conditional Delivery
Another well-recognized area of nonapplicability of the parol evidence rule
may be described as the "conditional
delivery" situation. The term delivery
has remained more meaningful in relation to deeds of conveyance than it has
with respect to contracts. Nevertheless,
the term is still used in relation to informal contracts to indicate those operative facts manifesting an intention that
the agreement become presently effective between the parties. Since contractual obligations are, in theory at least,
consensual, and since deeds of conveyance are volitional acts of the grantor,
such intention for present effectiveness
is vital in each case.
Now assume that plaintiff sues defendant for damages for breach of a
contract, whereby defendant promised
to buy a large quantity of bricks from
plaintiff. Plaintiff introduces in evidence
a lengthy written agreement of sale and
testifies to its execution by himself and
defendant. Later defendant offers oral
evidence of an understanding between
the parties made before or contemporaneously with the signing of the written
agreement that the contract was not
to be binding unless and until defendant
secured a contract with the local school
district for the construction of a school
house, and that he didn't get the contract. When this line of evidence is
offered, one can well imagine plaintiff's
attorney objecting strenuously to its admission on the ground that it would
contravene the parol evidence rule by
varying the terms of the written contract.
Prima facie the objection taken by
plaintiff is plausible. The writing states
an unadorned promise by defendant to
buy. Yet now defendant is seeking to
show that his promise was really "I
promise to buy IF." Thus it would
seem that defendant is trying to change
an unconditional promise into one con6. Wells v. Niagara Land & Timber Co.,
243 Mich. 550, 220 N.W. 667 (1928).

taining a condition precedent to any
immediately performable duty thereunder. Yet defendant should be able to
get the evidence in, supported by a long
line of authorities in every state in the
Union, including Michigan., The theory
is that defendant's evidence is not intended to alter the terms of a contract,
but to show that the writing was signed
conditionally and therefore never became
a contract since the specified condition
did not occur. Thus the parol evidence
rule does not apply since it only protects the terms of effective instruments.

Showers and Frischkorn Cases
The "conditional delivery" analysis is
theoretically unimpeachable. It has, provided a vehicle for utilizing extrinsic
evidence in many instances where arguably the parol evidence rule should have
compelled its being disregarded. The
utility of the theory and its hazards,
are, however, revealed by an analysis of
two Michigan cases: White Showers,
Inc. v. Fischers and Frischkorn Real
Estate Co. v. Haskins.9 In White Showers plaintiff and defendant executed a
written agreement whereby defendant
agreed to buy an irrigation system.
The writing expressly stated that "this
order covers all agreements", and was
accompanied by defendant's post-dated
check for one-half the purchase price
of the system. Upon defendant's refusal to accept delivery, his stoppage
of payment on the check, and his refusal to pay the balance, plaintiff sued
for damages for breach of contract. The
defense, in support of which defendant
offered parol evidence, was that he had
ordered an irrigation system from another supplier, that when the written
contract was made with plaintiff, it was
agreed that it would be ineffective unless defendant could cancel the other
7. Taylor v. Rugenstein, 245 Mich. 152,
222 N.W. 107 (1928); Sharrar v. Wayne
Savings Ass'n., 246 Mich. 225, 224 N.W.
379 (1929); White Showers, Inc. v. Fischer, 278 Mich. 32, 270 N.W. 205 (1936);
Malone v. Kugel, 281 Mich. 351, 275 N.W.
169 (1937); Kachanowski v. Cohen, 305
Mich. 438, 9 N.W. (2d) 667 (1943).
8. Note 7, above.
9. 226 Mich. 30, 196 N.W. 888 (1924)'.
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order, and that he had been unable to
do so. This evidence was admitted by
the trial court, the verdict was for defendant, and the judgment was affirmed
by the Supreme Court. The court clearly
enunciated the conditional delivery rule,
declaring: "No attempt was made . . .
to alter, vary, contradict, or add to the
writing, but oral testimony was offered
in support of the proposition that there
never was a contract." The court disposed of the argument that this theory
was foreclosed by the stipulation in the
writing that "this order covers all agreements" by observing that the stipulation
"pre-supposes a binding contract inasmuch as only a binding contract could
give life to the stipulation. Without such
a contract, there is nothing to which
the stipulation could be attached. It is
an essential part of the contract, if there
be one, and could only have force and
effect after proof of the existence of
the contract itself. It cannot be used to
give life to something which had not
as yet come into being."
The White Showers decision came
down twelve years after Frischkorn. A
brief review of the earlier case will reveal the fundamental similarity of facts
and the polar disparity of th6 holdings.
The plaintiff in Frischkorn sued defendant on a written contract for the exchange of real estate. The writing
provided that "In the event that the
exchange is not affected [sic] by reason
of my [defendant's] refusal or inability
to do so, I agree to pay Frischkorn
Real Estate Co., all damages they may
sustain by reason thereof." The defense
asserted that there was a condition upon
delivery of the written contract that it
should not become effective unless defendant could secure the consent of a
mortgagee to a division of his mortgage
on the whole tract, part of which was
to be exchanged. Not securing that consent, defendant contended that the agreement never became effective as a contract. The trial court admitted evidence
to support this defense, and defendant
had verdict and judgment in his favor.
The Supreme Court reversed the
judgment, holding this evidence inad-

missible. While it recognized and approved earlier decisions applying the
conditional delivery analysis to justify
admission of extrinsic evidence, the court
held that the evidence offered by defendant related to a term covered by
the quoted clause, that it varied the
terms of the writing
and should not
10
have been admitted.
I submit that these two decisions are
basically in conflict despite the court's
slight effort in the White Showers case
to reconcile its earlier holding. Why the
provision of the Frischkorn contract that
defendant would pay damages if he was
unwilling or unable to perform, foreclosed evidence that this provision and
the rest of the writing never became
a contract because of the non-occurrence
of a condition precedent, while the term
of the White Showers writing that it
covered all agreements between the parties did not render extrinsic evidence
of a condition on delivery inadmissible
is, I believe, a question no aspect of
the parol evidence rule theory is capable
of answering. The answer, if any there
is, lies, in the court's unspoken general
reaction to the merits of the defense
in each case or the credibility of the
evidence to support it. Sporadic and
unexplained departures from or refusals
to apply recognized doctrine create real
difficulty for lawyers; they make prediction hazardous. Yet, it seems that such
apparent aberrations as the Frischkorn
decision lie outside the main stream.
The conditional delivery theory remains
a useful device for the lawyer seeking
to utilize extrinsic evidence to relieve
his client of an obligation because of
non-occurrence of a condition precedent
where the writing indicates the duty is
unconditional.

Understanding of Parties
The application of the conditional
delivery analysis frequently means adoption of a view of the case which
probably differs from the actual understanding of the parties. The White
10. See also New Prague Flouring Mill
Co. v. Hewett Grain & Provision Co., 226
Mich. 35, 196 N.W. 890 (1924).
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Showers case again can be used for
illustration. According to the view there
accepted by the court, no contract was
to come into existence between the
parties until defendant had determined
that he could cancel his other order
for an irrigation system. Therefore, until that event occurred, theoretically no
binding obligation of any kind existed
between the parties. We might say that
the parties had agreed that defendant's
acceptance of plaintiff's offer to sell
would become effective at a future time
on the happening of the specified condition. This is all well and good, but
what if defendant had decided, before
the condition occurred, that he preferred
not to go through with the deal because
of an attractive new offer from another
supplier of irrigation systems. Could he
avoid liability on the written agreement
with plaintiff merely by withdrawing his
acceptance before the condition precedent to its effectiveness occurred? Our
general theories of mutual assent would
-indicate that he could, but does anyone
really believe such was the actual intention of the parties at the time they
signed the writing and agreed that defendant would not be bound unless he
could cancel his earlier order? I doubt
seriously that the parties intended to
reserve such freedom of action. They,
of course, would not be expected to
think in terms of a nice distinction between a condition precedent to the
existence of a contract and a condition
precedent to an immediately performable duty under an existent contract. Yet
if they had, the latter would in all probability have been their intention. They
probably intended to bind each other
fulv, at the time they signed the writing, but with the understanding that
defendant would not have to perform
if unable to secure his release from the
other order. In legal parlance, they
doubtless intended to make a present
contract with defendant's promise to
buy being conditional. But, encumbered
by the parol evidence rule, the court
felt unable to countenance evidence that
a promise appearing in writing without
any condition attached was in fact conditional. This obstacle mraculously vanished, however, if the condition was

regarded as precedent to the existence
of any contract at all.
Despite these difficulties, the "conditional delivery" analysis can render yeoman service-and without any sharpshooting with the facts by counsel who
wants to prove the condition. His client
and the other party to the agreement
have in 99.9% of the cases not analyzed
their transaction in legal terms. If the
parol condition was agreed to, the "conditional delivery" analysis does effectuate
their intention in substance. Admittedly,
close analysis can tear the rationale to
shreds, but as a practical matter, it
serves remarkably well to neutralize the
rigidity of much parol evidence rule
thinking. It doesn't take much of a stick
to beat a third-rate dog.

Non-Applicability
One rather significant limitation on the
utility of the conditional delivery analysis
should be noted. With respect to deeds
of conveyance, a grantor cannot establish by extrinsic evidence that the deed
he manually delivered to the grantee
was not to become effective until the
happening of a certain condition." Two
grounds are given for this view: first,
the parol evidence rule and second,
the ancient common law notion that a
delivery in escrow must be made to a
stranger and not to the grantee. History,
not reason or the demands of justice,
explains this limitation on the concept
of conditional delivery.
Another well recognized area of nonapplicability of the parol evidence rule
is in interpreting the terms of an ambiguous document. The idea that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to
aid in interpreting an unambiguous instrument is stated repeatedly in the
Michigan cases. I will not undertake to
develop fully the criticisms which can
be made of this limitation. It seems
based on the notion that some words,
and perhaps most, have a fixed generally
known meaning, and that evidence to
show that the parties to the instrument
attributed to its terms a different meaning is to vary, alter or contradict the
11. Takacs v. Takacs, 317 Mich. 72,
26 N.W. (2d) 712 (1947).
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writing. This view was expressed in
Mr. Justice Holmes' well-known observation that "it would open too great risks
if evidence were admissible to show that
when they said five hundred feet they
agreed it should mean one hundred
inches, or that Bunker Hill Monument
should signify the Old South Church." 12
It is perhaps a sufficient answer to the
proponents of this view that every day
parties are so agreeing on special meanings in special codes, and that the risks
are being borne. Words should be recognized as fluid symbols of meaning,
used in differing ways by different persons or groups of persons and, not infrequently, by the same persons at
different times. It should be realized
of course, that the person who urges
that five hundred feet was really intended to mean one hundred inches has,
and should have, a greater risk of not
persuading the court and jury that his
assertion is true, than might another
who asserted that "red feet", "pink feet"
or some other ambiguous term meant
one hundred inches. If the term is
patently ambiguous, or if its common
meaning makes no sense in the context,
the more probable it becomes that the
parties by agreement have fixed its meaning for the transaction. Also a court may
properly exclude testimony of a party
that when the writing he signed said.
"I promise to pay $100" he really meant
"I promise to pay $75." But this exclusion depends not upon the mere fact
that "$100" is unambiguous, but on the
fact that a person's objectively manifested intention, and not his subjective
intention or will, determines the consequences of his acts. The administration
of justice is not improved by attempting
to handle difficult problems of the credibility of evidence or substantive questions concerning what intention shall be
legally operative within the format of
the parol evidence rule.

Some Flexibility
Despite the tendency expressed in the
Michigan cases to limit the use of ex12. Holmes, "Theories of Legal Interpretation", 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417 (1899).

trinsic evidence for the purpose of interpreting an instrument to those cases in
which the writing is ambiguous, considerable flexibilitv remains. Actual]v it
is doubtful that the asserted limitation
provides much of a barrier to the admission of evidence. In the first place, in
applying the rule, the court must first
determine if there is an ambiguity. Here
wide discretion is available. The court
recognizes a distinction between patent
ambiguity-that which appears from the
face of the writing-and latent ambignity-that which arises when an effort is
made to apply the verbal symbols to
external objects. The court holds that
extrinsic evidence is admissible to show
that a latent ambiguity exists," :t and if
an ambiguity is thus found it may be
explained by extrinsic evidence. Ambiguity is in any event a highly relative
matter. Thus the term "profit" has been
held ambiguous and therefore explainable by extrinsic evidence,' 4 as has the
the term "steam pipes and steam engines" in an insurance policy.1 5 On the
other hand, the Michigan court has held
the words "any and all money due us"
in an assignment to be unambiguous
and therefore not subject to interpretation. 16 It is interesting to note, howe'ver.
that in the last mentioned case the court
did not in fact interpret the instrument
it declared unambiguous without an,
reference to extrinsic evidence. It, at
least, took account of the fact that the
document had been prepared by one
of the parties so as to apply the rule of
interpretation contra proferentem.
To summarize briefly on the use of
parol evidence for the purpose of interpreting a written instrument, I believe
counsel is warranted in urging a court
13.

Zilwaukee v. Saginaw-Bay City By.

Co.. 213 Mich. 61, 181 N.W. 37 (1921):

Hall v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 295
Mich. 404, 295 N.W. 204 (1940).
14. Brown v. A. F. Bartlett & Co., 201
Mich. 268, 167 N.W. 847 (1918).
15.

Roddis Lumber Co. v. Insurance

Co., 330
(1951).

16.

Mich.

81,

47 N.W.

(2d)

23

Michigan Chandelier Co. x,. Morse,

297 Mich. 41, 297 N.W. 64 (1941).
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that whether extrinsic evidence offered
will vary or contradict the document
cannot be determined until it is first
ascertained what the words of the instrument itself mean. If these words have
a generally accepted meaning which
would make sense in the context, the
risks are, of course, increased that the
person who asserts that they really have
some special, peculiar meaning will not
convince the court or the jury that his
assertion is true. If the trial judge is
not convinced, he may exclude the evidence or tell the jury to disregard it
on the ground that the instrument itself
is unambiguous and needs no interpretation. On the other hand, if a substantial showing is offered that the special
meaning was intended, the process of
interpretation by reference to extrinsic
parol evidence is usually available. As
Professor Corbin has observed: "Just
when the court should quit listening to
testimony that white is black and that
a dollar is fifty cents is a matter for
sound judicial discretion and common
sense. Even these things may be true
for some purposes. As long as the court
is aware that there may be doubt and
ambiguity and uncertainty in the meaning and application of agreed language,
it will welcome testimony as to antecedent agreements, communications, and
other factors that may help to decide
17
the issue."
In view of the risk that a court may
foreclose use of extrinsic evidence if the
terms of the document seem comprehensible and readily referrable to external objects, counsel may in some cases
prefer to seek reformation in equity on
the ground of mutual mistake in integration, rather than to seek the same end
by the process of interpretation of the
instrument as written. Choosing the
course to pursue requires counsel to
evaluate past judicial behavior carefully
in order that he may better predict the
future.

Where Admissible
We have thus far noted that extrinsic
parol evidence is admissible to show the
17.

Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 579 (1951).

vitiating factors of fraud, accident, duress and mistake and to show that the
document was never agreed to as a
presently effective contract. Such evidence strikes at the instrument as a
whole. Similarly, evidence is admissible
to show that while the writing was valid
and effective as a statement of part of
the agreement of the parties, it was not
a total integration, and that part of the
agreement, not superseded or discharged
by the execution of the writing was left
in parol. While there is some vascillation in the cases, there is abundant
authority in Michigan decisions for the
reception of evidence extrinsic to the
writing to establish it as only a partial
integration.' s In many of the cases cited
below, the partial integration rationale
is not well articulated but it is identifiable. Perhaps the best treatment is in
Brady v. Central Excavators, Inc.,19
where the court quoted with approval
the following language from the Connecticut case of Cohn v. Dunn:20
"The fundamental question is one
of the intent of the parties. Did they
intend to make the writing the repository of their final understanding
upon the particular matter of agreement as to which evidence is offered
18. Strohauer v. Voltz, 42 Mich. 444,
4 N.W. 161 (1880); Stahelin v. Sowle, 87
Mich. 124, 49 N.W. 529 (1891); Mowry
v. Mowry, 137 Mich. 277, 100 N.W. 388
(1904); Swarthout v. Shields, 185 Mich.
427, 152 N.W. 202 (1915); Cash Register
Co. v. Verbrugge, 263 Mich. 243, 248 N.W.
608 (1933); Bonding & Ins. Co. v.Freight
Lines, Inc., 286 Mich. 179, 281 N.W. 584
(f938); Labadie v. Boehle, 288 Mich. 223,
284 N.W. 707 (1939); Gottesman v. Rheinfrank, 303 Mich. 153, 5 N.W. (2d) 701
(1942); Smith v. Heinze, 305 Mich. 290,
9 N.W. (2d) 545 (1943); Lumber & Cedar
Co. v. Thomson, 309 Mich. 263, 15 N.W.
(2d) 155 (1944); Brady v. Central Excavators, Inc., 316 Mich. 594, 25 N.W. (2d)
630 (1947); Tunley v. Beall, 323 Mich.
108, 34 N.W. (2d) 477 (1948); Martin v.
Miller, 336 Mich. 265, 57 N.W. (2d) 878
(1953); Piasecki v. Fidelity Corporation of
Michigan, 339 Mich. 328, 63 N.W. (2d)
671 (1954).
19. 316 Mich. 594, 25 N.W. (2d) 630
(1947).
20. 111 Conn. 342, 149 Aft. 851 (1930)!
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dehors the writing. If so, such evidence must be excluded. If, however,
it appears that the parties intended
to restrict the writing to specific subjects of negotiations, then other subjects may be proven 'even though they
be (as they always are) different from
the writing.' This intent is to be sought
in the conduct and language of the
parties and the surrounding circumstances."
The court in the same case approved
the following statement by Dean
Wigmore:
"The document alone will not suffice. What it was intended to cover
cannot be known until we know what
there was to cover. The question
being whether certain subjects of negotiation were intended to be covered,
we must compare the writing and
the negotiations before we can determine whether they were in fact
covered."
The basic rationale of these statements is clear: before evidence of additional or different undertakings by one or
more of the parties can be declared
legally inoperative, the writing adduced
must be established by extrinsic evidence
to have been agreed upon as a final and
complete integration of all the agreements. Until it has been so characterized,
there is no rule of evidence or substantive law which forecloses reliance on
other agreements made earlier.
It has often been thought that in
determining the applicability of the
parol evidence rule it was essential to
determine whether the additional undertaking was collateral to the writing, not
in conflict with any of the written terms,
and of such nature that in common practice parties would reasonably be expected to leave it in parol while writing
the rest of their agreement. I submit
that, at most, these factors are some
evidence of intention but not absolute
requirements for the admission of the
extrinsic evidence. It seems only reasonable for the trier of fact to be less
inclined to believe that another promise
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was made, if that promise was typical
of those customarily included in a writing of the kind the parties have executed.
and it does not appear in the document
introduced. But parties not infrequently.
for reasons sufficient to them, depart
from the norm. Since the so-called parol
evidence rule does not purport to require a writing for validity or enforceability of the promise, the parol or
extrinsic promise should be given effect
if the one asserting it can convince the
trier of fact that it was made and not
abrogated by later agreement. The iendency to cloak the difficult process of
evaluating the probative value of evidence behind a supposedly absolute rule
of exclusion is a kind of judicial weaseling that cannot be approved.
What the Rule Is
Having explored some major areas
where the parol evidence rule does not
apply and having considered what it
is not, perhaps we can formulate an
affirmative statement of what the rule
is. For the sake of simplicity, this formulation will be limited to contractual
transactions. The rule might read as
follows: when parties have made a valid
contract, not subject to any vitiating
defects in its inception, and have then
accurately stated their agreement in a
written instrument whose terms are clear
or have been properly interpreted by
extrinsic evidence, and have also agreed
that the document shall be the integration of the totality of their agreement.
this document cannot be altered, varied
or contradicted by proof that earlier they
had negotiated about or come to agreement on different terms. So stated, the
parol evidence rule makes quite good
sense. It amounts to nothing more than
saying that if at a certain point in time,
the parties have agreed that the written
instrument contains the totality of their
undertakings, any earlier, inconsistent
agreements must have been abrogated
by mutual assent. If they have been
abrogated, they are legally inoperative,
and there is no reason to clutter the
record by introducing evidence of such
matters. Thus the actual exclusion of
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such evidence can be predicated on a
clearly valid rule of evidence-that proof
which is irrelevant and immaterial to
the issues involved in the action should
not be admitted. The parol evidence
rule itself thus appears, not as a rule
for the exclusion of evidence, but as a
substantive rule of discharge or rescission of earlier undertakings which the
parties have agreed shall no longer be
binding upon them.
It is evident from the extended formulation of the parol evidence rule
just suggested, that some troublesome
questions of fact must be decided before
the rule can properly be invoked. The
rule is not applicable merely because
there is a writing offered by one of the
parties. The writing must have a very
special character, given to it by the
agreement of the parties. How then is
the determination to be made that the
writing was given that character? Who
decides this preliminary question of fact?
-In short, how is the determination made
that the parol evidence rule applies?
Certain Michigan decisions, particularly some of the earlier ones, asserted
that where parties in a contractual situa-

tion have executed a writing, it must
be presumed that the writing contains
the totality of their agreements, that a
contract cannot rest partly in writing and
partly in parol.2t If by such statements
the Supreme Court meant that the document in some way conclusively proves
its own character, its own completeness,
its own status as an integration of all
the agreements of the parties, the statements are patently unsound. Putting
aside for the moment a few very special
cases such as the ancient document or
certain instruments acknowledged before
a public official, one can assert that no
document proves itself in any respect,
and a contractual looking document, no
matter how formal in terminology or
how bedecked with ribbons and seals
21. Rumely & Co. v. Emmons, 85 Mich.
511, 48 N.W. 636 (1891); Tufford v.
Gordon, 217 Mich. 658, 187 N.W. 264
(1922); Danto v. Charles C. Robbins, Inc.,
250 Mich. 419, 230 N.W. 188 (1930).

has, per se, no more bearing on the legal

relations of the parties to the lawsuit
than a recent edition of the London

Times. The execution and delivery of the
instrument, its freedom from vitiating
defects, and its completeness and ac-

curacy as an integration of the totality
of the understakings of the parties must
be established or at least may be nega-

tived by extrinsic evidence.

Impact on Trial
If the foregoing analysis of what the
parol evidence rule is, is sound, does

it have any meaningful impact at all
on the trial of cases, beyond of course
the substantive impact as a rule of discharge or rescission mentioned earlier.
It clearly does in at least one respect.
In common law cases we generally accept without question the proposition
that the jury is the trier of fact and that
it is not the proper function of the court
to determine the credibility of witnesses
or make the essential factual determina-

tions. The parol evidence rule represents
one rather important inroad on this
generalization. For example, if a contractual transaction rests entirely in parol, the parties may adduce evidence of
what the promise was, and it is clearly
the function of the jury to determine
if defendant made the promise which he
denies and plaintiff asserts. But suppose
that in the transaction, the parties executed a writing containing "promise one"
by defendant and plaintiff now asserts
that defendant also made "promise two"
which the parties agreed should not be
stated in the document. In this kind of
situation, the court is inserted in front
of the jury as the trier of fact on at
least a tentative basis. The court will
first determine whether the parties intended the writing to be the totality of
their agreement, and if its conclusion is
in the affirmative, it has laid the foundation for regarding evidence of the alleged oral promise made earlier as
irrelevant and immaterial. Even in making this preliminary determination, the
trial court should hear evidence of negotiations and surrounding circumstances,
though it may determine later that this
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evidence is to be disregarded. If the
court at this stage concludes that the
parties did not agree upon the writing
as a final and total integration, it then
passes on to the jury the question

whether defendant actually made the
promise plaintiff is asserting. In this
connection the jury uses the same evidence the court considered in making
its preliminary determination of the
question of integration.
It is pointless here to argue the merits
of this judicial pre-emption of the factfinding function. The parol evidence rule
is not its only illustration. Judicial distrust of the vagaries of juries is an age

old phenomenon and perhaps it is sufficient merely to recognize its manifestations.
Inconsistencies
While the foregoing analysis of the
parol evidence rule and its operation
seems to me to be sound, and while
it finds ample support in the Michigan
cases, candor and realism require a
recognition that its application has not
been consistent, or, in any event, not
consistently apparent. For example,
Michigan is one of the minority of jurisdictions employing the parol evidence
rule as a basis for rejecting proof of
an express oral understanding concerning a term which would be in the
writing only by implication. Thus where
a written contract is silent as to the
time for performance, the Supreme Court
has held inadmissible evidence of an
extrinsic agreement on this subject, on
the ground that it would vary the implied provision for performance within
a reasonable time. 22 Yet this situation
would seem to lend itself peculiarly well
to a conclusion, supported by extrinsic
evidence, that the parties did not agree
upon the document as a final integration of the totality of their undertakings
and that the extrinsic agreement should
control.
22. Stange v. Wilson, 17 Mich. 342
(1868); Coon v. Spaulding, 47 Mich. 162,
10 N.W. 183 (1881).

In other cases the Supreme Court has
disapproved the trial court's admission
of extrinsic evidence or approved its
rejection by the casual invocation of a
supposedly clear-cut rule of exclusion
without giving any real indication of
the basis upon which it was concluded
that the writing was a total integration
23
superseding all earlier parol agreements.
For example, there is a line of cases
holding that upon sale of the assets of
a going business, the sale being evidenced by a written agreement, parol
evidence of a prior or contemporaneous
agreement by the seller not to compete
24
with the purchaser cannot be used.
Other illustrations may be found in the
cases holding inadmissible, or at least
inoperative, evidence of express warranties of goods sold which are not
stated in the writing.25 (These decisions
do not, of course, foreclose reliance on
an implied warranty of fitness in appropriate cases. 21 ) In many, if not all, of
these cases it would be hard to argue
dogmatically that the actual decision was
wrong or for that matter that the court
did not reach its conclusion on exactly
the basis suggested here. If the trial
court has heard evidence as to the negotiations and surrounding circumstances
23. Karnov v. Goldman, 229 Mich. 551.
201 N.W. 447 (1924); Kay v. Miller, 235
Mich. 304, 209 N.W. 46 (1926).
24. Davis v. Steingass, 215 Mich. 57,
183 N.W. 713 (1921); Rose v. Waddell,
230 Mich. 161, 202 N.W. 987 (1925);
Danto v. Charles C. Robbins, Inc., 250
Mich. 419, 230 N.W. 188 (1930); Getter
v. Levine, 315 Mich. 353, 24 N.W. (2d)
149 (1946).
25. Nichols, Shepard & Co. v. Crandall,
77 Mich. 401, 43 N.W. 875, 6 LRA 412
(1889); Hallwood Cash Register Co. v.
Millard, 127 Mich. 316, 86 N.W. 833 (1901);
Witteman Co. v. Beck Malting, Etc., Co.,
183 Mich. 227, 150 N.W. 109 (1914); Salzman v. Maldover, 315 Mich. 403, 24 N.W.
(2d) 161 (1946); Beaman v. Testori, 323
Mich. 194, 35 N.W. (2d) 155 (1948);
Standard Oil Company v. Ganser, 331 Mich.
29, 49 N.W. (2d) 45 (1951).
26. See cases in Note 25; also Little v.
G. E. Van Syckle & Co., 115 Mich. 480,
73 N.W. 554 (1898); Detroit Shipbuilding
Co. v. Cromstock, 144 Mich. 516, 108 N.W.
286 (1906); Lutz v. Hill-Diesel Engine Co.,
255 Mich. 98, 237 N.W. 546 (1931).
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and has then concluded that the writing
was agreed upon as a final and complete integration, evidence of earlier
negotiation and agreement becomes, as
has been noted, quite irrelevant. If the
Supreme Court later approves the trial
court's determination, it may very well
elide its approving discussion by a terse
reference to a rule forbidding variation
of a writing parol. The cases where the
Supreme Court reverses on the ground
that the trial court erred in admitting
the extrinsic evidence are a little harder
to explain and justify. They may, however, represent nothing more than a
conclusion that on the record reasonable men could only have decided that
the parties did intend to integrate, that
the trial court's contrary determination
was not supported by substantial evidence, and that superseded and therefore irrelevant agreements were improperly given force and effect. It can only
be said that the rationale is not always
clear.

Other Cases
One further group of cases is worthy
of brief mention, since they seem to
indicate clearly that the parol evidence
rule and its proper operation have not
received from our court the careful
analysis they merit. For want of a better
name, these may be called the "sham
agreement" cases. Typically they present situations where the parties have
executed a formal and prima facie complete instrument, contract, mortgage, etc.,
but have- agreed that it shall not be
operative at all or that the obligation
shall not be complete and personal but
will only be satisfied in a particular way
or out of a particular source. Here the
Michigan cases seem to be in hopeless
conflict and confusion. For example, it
-,vas held in an early case that parol
evidence was admissible to show that a
purchase money mortgage was agreed
to be a sham, given only to keep the
mortgagee's relatives from knowing he
27
had given the land to the mortgagor.
27. Church v. Case, 110 Mich. 621, 68
N.W. 424 (1896).
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Similarly, evidence was admitted to show
that a written land contract was agreed
to be without binding effect, signed only
to mislead the vendor's children, and
that the vendee could get specific performance of an earlier, unabrogated oral
agreement. 28 The court has approved the
admission of evidence to show an oral
agreement that a contract to pay for
the services of a tree surgeon was understood to be unenforceable and to
have been signed only to indicate that
29
the workers had completed the job. 1
In an action on a promissory note signed
by defendant as guardian of a minor,
the Supreme Court approved the use of
evidence that defendant was not authorized to bind the infant's estate and that
there was a parol understanding that
defendant would not be personally liable
on the note.30 Other illustrations of simi31
lar import could be given.
On the other hand, the Supreme
Court has held extrinsic evidence inadmissible to show that a note, signed
by defendant, was agreed to be, not
a personal obligation, but one to be
paid, if at all, only from the dividends
of certain stock. 32 The court also has
disapproved the use of extrinsic evidence to show that a note signed by
defendant was understood and agreed
to be unenforceable and to have been
given for the sole purpose of clearing
the records of a stock broker until certain stock could be sold elsewhere. 33
28.

Woodward v. Walker, 192 Mich.

188, 158 N.W. 846 (1916).
29.

Schupp v. Davey Tree Expert Co.,

235 Mich. 268, 209 N.W. 85 (1926).
30.

Annisv v. Pfeiffer, 278 Mich. 692,

271 N.W. 568 (1937).
31.

See Protestant Ref. Church v. Lon-

don, 293 Mich. 547, 292 N.W. 486 (1940)
and Mardon v. Ferris, 328 Mich. 398, 43
N.W. (2d) 904 (1950).
32.

Anderson v. Engard, 236 Mich. 221,

210 N.W. 237 (1926); Bicknell v. Van
Hellen, 301 Mich. 695, 4 N.W. (2d) 61
(1942).
33.

MacCrone v. Eckert, 275 Mich. 683.

267 N.W. 766 (1936).
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The cases in the first group referred
to are entirely understandable and are in
accord with the views on the use of
parol evidence expressed here. If the
statements in the latter group of cases
are taken literally, they can only mean
that the Supreme Court has not always
recognized that the parol evidence rule
does not, or should not, be applied to
protect a document until that document
has been established as the final and
complete integration of a contract which
the parties meant to be presently enforceable according to its terms.
Enough of the Michigan cases have
now been examined to indicate a rational and workable theory concerning
the use of parol evidence, particularly
in contract cases. Clearly however, such
a theory or principle has not been consistently applied in Michigan decisions.
A careful review of the cases in this area
warrants the conclusion that the so-called
parol evidence rule has been responsible
for the wastage of much good paper
and ink, for the needless expenditure
of valuable time by counsel and courts,
for an unfortunate confusion and lack
of predictability as to the kind of evidence upon which litigants can rely,
and doubtless in some instances, for a
failure of our litigious processes to do
justice. The rule can be analyzed and
criticized until its apparent substance
vanishes like a wisp of smoke. It would
be a real improvement of our legal system if all the compiled learning about
the parol evidence rule could, along
with the rule itself, be simply expunged
from the books or, at most, retained
only to the extent of authorizing an instruction to the jury as to the burden
of proof or the weight of evidence in
actions where a party seeks to add to
or contradict a written instrument.
The primary function of the advocate-the practicing lawyer-is not, however, the reformation of our legal system.
He will be living and working with the
parol evidence rule and with courts
and opposing counsel who may regard
it as an essential defense of the sanctity
of instruments. Can any practical suggestions be made for -,vending a way
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safely through the maze of doctrine and
conflicting decisions? I would like to state.
very briefly, five suggestions, which, in
part, recapitulate views expressed here.
1. On those happy occasions
when
the client consults a lawyer before acting
and some opportunity is thus available
for shaping the transaction, the lawyer
can avoid much grief by seeing that any
writing prepared is in fact inclusive of
all the agreements which have been
made. I am not concerned now only
with writings required by law but also
with those optional writings around
which the parol evidence rule problem
may arise. Some of the best advice available is tersely stated in Dean Mason
Ladd's fine epigram: "'If you write at
all, write it all."
2. If the client is confronted bv a
claim upon an instrument which does
not accord with the meaning he insists
the parties intended the instrument to
have, the lawyer must choose between
two courses: (a) to seek to use extrinsic evidence for the purpose of interpreting the instrument so as to give
its words a proper meaning or (b) to
seek reformation of the instrument on
the ground of mistake. Which course
should be followed may depend on several considerations: (1) if the instrument
is thought to be ambiguous, interpretation by reference to parol evidence is
a clear channel; (2) if the offending
words appear to be clear and have a
generally accepted meaning which
makes sense in the context, the reasons
for using the equity road to reformation
become stronger; (3) traditional equity
doctrine concerning the burden of proof
in reformation suits may counter-balance
to some extent the advantages of the
reformation proceeding. If the lawyer
is urging a court to listen to extrinsic
evidence for purposes of interpretation,
he is certainly warranted in insisting that
variation or modification of the instrument cannot be found until it is first
determined what the instrument means.
3. The lawyer should be mindful of
the fact that the parol evidence rule
does not foreclose reliance on evidence
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to show that the instrument is voidable
because of fraud, duress, accident or
mistake. These flexible concepts will open
the door in many situations.
4. The lawyer should remember that
the parol evidence rule does not apply
to proof that the instrument never became an effective contract. Where the
defense on a contract claim is essentially breach or non-occurrence of a
condition precedent, it is frequently
quite as easy, and in many respects
quite as realistic, to regard the condition
as precedent to the existence of a contract, as to regard it as a condition precedent to a promise within a contract.
The conditional delivery analysis can
often be used to avoid the stringencies
of the parol evidence rule.
5. If it is clear to the lawyer that
the instrument was validly executed as
a presently effective contract but his
client insists that other promises were
-also made, he may be able to get parol
evidence in, not by making a frontal

attack on the parol evidence rule, but
by emphasizing that he seeks to show
that the document was agreed upon
as only a partial and not as a total
integration of the contract. He can,
with support from the best authorities,
assert that until the latter fact is established the parol evidence rule has no
application. He should emphasize the
fact that the document simply cannot
prove itself.
Theories are available for avoiding
the parol evidence rule or limiting it
to its proper sphere. If the extrinsic evidence is weak and not reasonably believable, it probably should not be given
effect in any event, and one cannot
complain too much if the shovel used
to dig its grave is the parol evidence
rule. On the other hand, if the evidence
is substantial, and, if true, sufficient to
show a meritorious claim or effective defense, analyses which may avoid the
application of the rule and get the evidence to the trier of fact are at the
lawyer's disposal.
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